Jonathan is not yet 3 years old. The railroads think he might be a terrorist.
Okay, that’s a little strong: they think I might be a terrorist, and I’m using him as “cover.” Several times we’ve been at a train station, outside a yard, or at a road crossing and railroad police have watched us closely. A few times they’ve come up and talked to us; always with kind, gentle conversation, but nonetheless probing, trying to figure out if we’re as innocent as we look.
Reading around, I find that we’ve had it much easier than some. “Railfans” without kids are given more scrutiny, and those who make a hobby of photographing trains are given the most scrutiny of all. There are many in that last category; just consider railfan websites with 700,000 photos or 168,000 photos. Some of those photographers have seen it cross from scrutiny to “harrassment.”
The photographers have often wondered why it isn’t obvious that they are innocent rail fans; I’ve wondered why it isn’t obvious that I’m with Jonathan, and he loves trains, and we’re just out for an innocent bit of train-watching. I decided to see if I could find out what was behind it, and I found answers.
Consider:
- Rail attacks are more numerous and deadly than those on airports and airplanes.
- Rail terrorism is so easy, you can find how-to instructions on YouTube.
- A typical tank car can hold 90,000 gallons of chlorine; if released, estimates say the lethal cloud would drift from 5 to 15 miles, depending on atmospheric conditions. In a populated city, this would mean a death toll ranging from a few hundred to a million.
- Access to tank cars is so easy that 13-year-olds can create graffiti masterpieces on them. More seriously, a reporter walked into 48 chemical plant railroad yards and found free access to cars with toxic chemicals in each of them.
I’ll make it simple: railroads carry weapons of mass destruction and leave them accessible to 13-year-olds.
This is the inherent form of railroads; it is not possible to eliminate access. Not possible — look at the argument over securing the U.S.–Mexico border. That border is only 1951 miles long; but American railroads operate on 120,000 miles of active track, not including yards, sidings, or even parallel track. To deal with reality, we must accept that railroad security cannot happen by eliminating access. Security must be formed through other methods.
Top on the list of other security methods is identifying what a threat looks like, and watching for it. The graffiti artist couldn’t figure out how to release the contents of his “canvas” if he wanted to; he’s not a significant threat. Unfortunately, the world has seen enough terrorism that we have a long list of real threat characteristics to watch for. High on that list, for example, is photography. Photographic reconnaissance is one of the first steps of almost every successful terrorist attack on infrastructure. Photographs can be used for development of 3D models and for determining GPS coordinates, which can in turn be used for training attackers. As it happens, railfans love photographing vulnerabilities: most pictures are taken at road crossings, bridges, or other points of weakness. I find it hard to fault the railroads for being sensitive in this area.
What photographers seem to find fault with, however, is not so much the security against them as it is the lack of apparent security in other areas. Yet that can be deceiving. In my “real job” I’ve done a tiny bit of work on a few security-related projects, and even in these small-time situations the people involved don’t want their security measures to be obvious. I’ve helped find ways to hide video cameras, license-plate cameras, laser proximity sensors and infrared detectors. If security measures are obvious, then they are known — and when known, they can be avoided. In reality the railroad security measures implemented since 2001 have been extensive.
One way to measure the levels of “hidden” security is by checking the reviews of those with access to the information. Greg Feith, a former accident investigator for the NTSB, has said that the aviation industry should “take a lesson” from the rail industry security implementation. In 2003, the American Association of Railroads received the 2003 James S. Cogswell Award for Industrial Security; of 11,000 eligible organizations, only 15 awards were given.
We can also look at the formal security structure at a higher level for clues to how serious they are about security at a lower level. Here we find things such as a DOD-certified Operations Center monitoring and evaluating secret intelligence on potential threats; the Railway Alert Network (RAN), for rapid communication throughout the industry; and ST-ISAC, the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center, operating with the government at the Top Secret level to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on threats.
There is also strong financial incentive for the railroads to focus on significant security measures. For example, the Union Pacific freight load consists of very roughly 5% dangerous chemicals, but 50% of their insurance costs are just covering those loads. A single incident could effectively destroy a company, financially.
Looking at the industry from this perspective, I find no fault with a railroad policeman asking me a few questions.
Make your life easier, and the lives of numerous others, by following a few simple rules. Don’t trespass; stay behind fences; kindly and quickly relocate when asked. Keep your distance and don’t give cause for alarm.
It’s not much to ask from an industry that gives so much to us.